MEV-ACE: Identity-Authenticated Fair Ordering for Proposer-Controlled MEV Mitigation
Jian Sheng Wang

TL;DR
MEV ACE introduces a blockchain protocol that ensures fair transaction ordering by authenticating identities, enabling verifiable commitments, and using randomness to prevent proposer manipulation and censorship.
Contribution
It presents a novel fair ordering protocol combining authenticated identities, auditable commitments, and verifiable delay randomness to mitigate proposer-controlled MEV.
Findings
Protocol guarantees order unpredictability after commitment set is fixed.
Authenticity of commitments is ensured under signature unforgeability.
Accountable inclusion is achieved for transactions with threshold receipts.
Abstract
Maximal Extractable Value, or MEV, remains a structural threat to blockchain fairness because a block producer can often observe pending transactions and unilaterally decide their ordering or inclusion. Existing mitigations hide transaction contents or outsource ordering, but they often leave two gaps unresolved. First, commitments are not authenticated by slashable identities. Second, inclusion obligations are not backed by transferable evidence that other validators can verify. This paper presents MEV ACE, a fair ordering protocol for proposer controlled ordering MEV. MEV ACE combines three mechanisms. First, it uses registered economic identities whose authentication keys are deterministically derived from the ACE GF framework and bonded on chain. Second, it uses authenticated commit and open messages with validator receipt thresholds, which make admissibility and inclusion…
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