Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Thiele Voting Rules with Voter Interval Preferences
Pasin Manurangsi, Krzysztof Sornat

TL;DR
This paper introduces a polynomial-time algorithm for computing optimal committees under Thiele voting rules for voter interval preferences, resolving a decade-old open problem.
Contribution
It extends polynomial-time computability to generalized Thiele rules on voter interval profiles, using a new concavity theorem and optimization techniques.
Findings
Algorithm solves the problem in polynomial time.
Concavity of the Thiele score function is established.
The approach generalizes to weighted Thiele rules.
Abstract
We present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an optimal committee of size under any given Thiele voting rule for elections on the Voter Interval domain (i.e., when voters can be ordered so that each candidate is approved by a consecutive voters). Our result extends to the Generalized Thiele rule, in which each voter has an individual weight (scoring) sequence. This resolves a 10-year-old open problem that was originally posed for Proportional Approval Voting and later extended to every Thiele rule (Elkind and Lackner, IJCAI 2015; Peters, AAAI 2018). Our main technical ingredient is a new structural result -- a concavity theorem for families of intervals. It shows that, given two solutions of different sizes, one can construct a solution of any intermediate size whose score is at least the corresponding linear interpolation of the two scores. As a consequence, on Voter…
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