Ghosting the Machine: Stop Calling Human-Agent Relations Parasocial

TL;DR

This paper argues that labeling human interactions with conversational agents as parasocial is inaccurate and oversimplifies complex social phenomena, impacting research and ethical considerations.

Contribution

It clarifies the theoretical inaccuracy of applying parasocial to human-agent relations and emphasizes recognizing their social complexity.

Findings

Parasocial refers to one-sided, character-governed relations, not unreal interactions.

Misapplication leads to oversimplification and misdiagnosis of effects.

Recognizing sociality is ethically and practically important.

Abstract

In discussions of human relations with conversational agents (CAs; e.g., voice assistants, AI companions, some social robots), they are increasingly referred to as parasocial. This is a misapplication of the term, heuristically taken up to mean "unreal." In this provocation, I briefly account for the theoretical trajectory of parasociality and detail why it is inaccurate to apply the notion to human interactions with CAs. In short, "parasocial" refers to a human-character relations that are one-sided, non-dialectical, character-governed, imagined, vicarious, predictable, and low-effort; the term has been co-opted to instead refer to relations that are seen as unreal or invalid. The scientific problematics of this misapplication are nontrivial. They lead to oversimplification of complex phenomena, misspecified variables and misdiagnosed effects, and devaluation of human experiences. Those challenges, in turn, have downstream effects on norms and practice. It is scientifically, practically, and ethically imperative to recognize the sociality of human-agent relations.