Causal Stance

TL;DR

This paper distinguishes between physical causation and causal closure, proposing a framework where physical determinism and causal closure are not necessarily linked, reconciling mental causation with physical determinism.

Contribution

It introduces a linguistic framework separating physical causation from causal closure, reconciling mental causation with physical determinism and challenging traditional views.

Findings

Physical causal closure is not required for physical determinism.

Reconstruction of Davidson's anomalous monism as a materialist position.

A linguistic framework where causal closure does not hold but determinism remains intact.

Abstract

What is the meaning of physical causal closure? Jaegwon Kim explicitly adopts a conception of causation according to which physical causation is effectively identified with deterministic physical lawfulness, and equates it with physical determinism. While this conception is internally coherent, it differs from currently dominant theories of causation. Physics and the theory of causation serve different descriptive purposes. In this study, we refer to them, respectively, as the Physical Stance and the Causal Stance. Within this framework, physical determinism belongs to the Physical Stance, and physical causal closure is defined only within the Causal Stance. Consequently, the two should not be equated. On this basis, this study reconstructs Davidson's anomalous monism as a materialist position that acknowledges mental causation without contradicting physical determinism. Furthermore, we propose a linguistic framework in which physical causal closure does not hold in the Causal Stance while physical determinism remains intact in the Physical Stance.