Towards Predicting Multi-Vulnerability Attack Chains in Software Supply Chains from Software Bill of Materials Graphs
Laura Baird, Armin Moin

TL;DR
This paper introduces a graph-based learning approach to predict multi-vulnerability attack chains in software supply chains using SBOMs, improving security analysis by modeling dependencies and vulnerabilities.
Contribution
It presents a novel SBOM-driven graph learning framework with HGAT and MLP models to identify vulnerabilities and cascading attack chains, outperforming traditional methods.
Findings
HGAT achieves 91.03% accuracy and 74.02% F1-score in component vulnerability classification.
MLP model attains 0.93 ROC-AUC in predicting vulnerability cascades.
Validated on 200 real-world SBOMs with promising results.
Abstract
Software supply chain security compromises often stem from cascaded interactions of vulnerabilities, for example, between multiple vulnerable components. Yet, Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)-based pipelines for security analysis typically treat scanner findings as independent per-CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) records. We propose a new research direction based on learning multi-vulnerability attack chains through a novel SBOM-driven graph-learning approach. This treats SBOM structure and scanner outputs as a dependency-constrained evidence graph rather than a flat list of vulnerabilities. We represent vulnerability-enriched CycloneDX SBOMs as heterogeneous graphs whose nodes capture software components and known vulnerabilities (i.e, CVEs), connected by typed relations, such as dependency and vulnerability links. We train a Heterogeneous Graph Attention Network (HGAT) to…
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