ShieldNet: Network-Level Guardrails against Emerging Supply-Chain Injections in Agentic Systems
Zhuowen Yuan, Zhaorun Chen, Zhen Xiang, Nathaniel D. Bastian, Seyyed Hadi Hashemi, Chaowei Xiao, Wenbo Guo, Bo Li

TL;DR
This paper introduces ShieldNet, a network-level guardrail system that detects supply-chain threats in agent systems by analyzing network interactions, significantly improving detection accuracy over existing methods.
Contribution
The paper presents ShieldNet, a novel network-based framework for detecting supply-chain attacks in agent systems, and introduces SC-Inject-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating such threats.
Findings
ShieldNet achieves up to 0.995 F-1 score in detection.
ShieldNet introduces minimal runtime overhead.
Existing MCP scanners perform poorly on supply-chain threat detection.
Abstract
Existing research on LLM agent security mainly focuses on prompt injection and unsafe input/output behaviors. However, as agents increasingly rely on third-party tools and MCP servers, a new class of supply-chain threats has emerged, where malicious behaviors are embedded in seemingly benign tools, silently hijacking agent execution, leaking sensitive data, or triggering unauthorized actions. Despite their growing impact, there is currently no comprehensive benchmark for evaluating such threats. To bridge this gap, we introduce SC-Inject-Bench, a large-scale benchmark comprising over 10,000 malicious MCP tools grounded in a taxonomy of 25+ attack types derived from MITRE ATT&CK targeting supply-chain threats. We observe that existing MCP scanners and semantic guardrails perform poorly on this benchmark. Motivated by this finding, we propose ShieldNet, a network-level guardrail framework…
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