Merkle Tree Certificate Post-Quantum PKI for Kubernetes and Cloud-Native 5G/B5G Core
Lakshya Chopra, Vipin Kumar Rathi

TL;DR
This paper introduces Merkle Tree Certificates for post-quantum PKI in Kubernetes and 5G, reducing signature overhead and enabling efficient, quantum-resistant certificate authentication.
Contribution
It designs MTC-based PKI architectures for Kubernetes and 5G, implementing and evaluating their performance with significant efficiency improvements.
Findings
MTC landmark verification completes in under 2 microseconds.
MTC reduces on-wire signature overhead in TLS handshakes.
Implementation in Go shows no measurable impact on handshake time.
Abstract
Post-quantum signature schemes such as ML-DSA-65 produce signatures of 3,309 bytes and public keys of 1,952 bytes over 50 times larger than classical Ed25519. In TLS-authenticated environments like Kubernetes control planes and 5G Core networks, where every inter-component connection is mutually authenticated, this overhead compounds across thousands of handshakes per second. Merkle Tree Certificates (MTC), currently under development at IETF, replace per-certificate issuer signatures with Merkle inclusion proofs and, in the landmark mode, eliminate on-wire signatures from certificate authentication entirely. We present MTC-based PKI architectures for Kubernetes and 3GPP 5G Service-Based Architecture. Starting from the infrastructure layer, we replace the Kubernetes cluster CA with an MTCA deployment that issues MTC certificates to control plane components, with cosigners and a…
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