Latency-Aware Resource Allocation over Heterogeneous Networks: A Lorentz-Invariant Market Mechanism
Saad Alqithami

TL;DR
This paper introduces a Lorentz-Invariant Auction mechanism for efficient, truthful resource allocation in heterogeneous delay networks, ensuring causal consistency and robustness across various telecom scenarios.
Contribution
The paper presents a novel auction mechanism that incorporates causal-ordering and invariance principles to improve resource allocation in delay-heterogeneous networks.
Findings
LIA maintains near-efficiency on Starlink and Internet networks.
LIA eliminates measured timing rents in tested scenarios.
Welfare is lower in thin markets but improves with network depth on DSN.
Abstract
We present a telecom-native auction mechanism for allocating bandwidth and time slots across heterogeneous-delay networks, ranging from low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite constellations to delay-tolerant deep-space relays. The Lorentz-Invariant Auction (LIA) treats bids as spacetime events and reweights reported values based on the \emph{horizon slack}, a causal quantity derived from the earliest-arrival times relative to a public clearing horizon. Unlike other delay-equalization rules, LIA combines a causal-ordering formulation, a uniquely exponential slack correction implied by a semigroup-style invariance axiom, and a critical-value implementation that ensures truthful reported values once slacks are fixed by trusted infrastructure. We analyze the incentive result in the exogenous-slack regime and separately examine bounded slack-estimation error and endogenous-delay limitations. Under…
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