Trustless Provenance Trees: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Operator-Gated Blockchain Registries
Ian C. Moore

TL;DR
This paper introduces a game-theoretic framework for trustless provenance trees on blockchain, resolving operator trust issues with cryptographic commitments and analyzing attack vectors to ensure integrity.
Contribution
It proposes a dual-layer cryptographic scheme to prevent false attributions and establishes a complete provenance integrity model with multiple mechanisms.
Findings
Proves correctness of the scheme under cryptographic assumptions.
Demonstrates the scheme's Nash equilibrium with honest behavior.
Analyzes attack vectors and necessary integrity mechanisms.
Abstract
We present a formal treatment of provenance trees, directed acyclic graphs of artifact registrations anchored immutably on a public blockchain, and introduce the operator trust problem: when a single privileged operator submits all on-chain registrations on behalf of users, the on-chain record alone cannot distinguish user-initiated registrations from unilateral operator actions. We resolve this through a dual-layer cryptographic commitment scheme in which two commitments derived from a single client-side secret key, binding the key to the tree root and to each unique registration identifier, make false attribution claims strictly dominated strategies. We prove correctness under standard cryptographic assumptions and establish honest behavior as the unique Nash equilibrium without relying on operator trust. We further introduce and analyze the tree poisoning problem: adversarial attacks…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
