Deception Equilibrium Analysis for Three-Party Stackelberg Game with Insider

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new three-party deception game framework with equilibria concepts, providing algorithms and analysis for enhancing security against insiders and external attackers.

Contribution

It proposes a unified three-party leader-follower game model with novel equilibrium concepts and scalable algorithms, extending classical deception game analysis.

Findings

Established conditions for equilibrium consistency.

Developed a hypergradient-based algorithm with convergence guarantees.

Applied theoretical results to wireless security and insider attack scenarios.

Abstract

This paper investigates strategic interactions within a three party deception security game involving a defender, an insider, and external attackers. We propose a robust deception mechanism where the leader manipulates game parameters perceived by followers to enhance defense performance when followers operate under misperceived and uncertain observation. Specifically, we propose a unified three party leader follower game framework and introduce the concepts of Deception Stackelberg equilibria (DSE) and Hyper Nash equilibria (HNE), which generalize classical two-player Stackelberg and deception games. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the consistency between DSE and HNE, ensuring that the defender's utility remains invariant when the hierarchical structure degenerates into a simultaneous-move scenario. Moreover, we propose a scalable hypergradient-based algorithm with established convergence guarantees for seeking DSE, efficiently addressing the computational challenges posed by non-smooth and set-valued best-response mappings. Finally, we apply theoretical analysis to practical scenarios in secure wireless communication and defense against insider-assisted false data injection attacks.