Distributive Politics, Representation, and Redistricting
Thomas Groll, Sharyn O'Halloran

TL;DR
This paper develops a comprehensive theory of how redistricting influences electoral outcomes and policy benefits, considering voter influence, representation types, and district composition effects.
Contribution
It introduces a model explaining the dual channels of districting impact on political influence and minority welfare, integrating electoral leverage and voter preferences.
Findings
District composition affects candidate matchups and voter responsiveness.
Packing benefits minorities when they are weak and value descriptive representation.
Cracking benefits minorities when they are pivotal and prioritize partisan outcomes.
Abstract
We develop a theory of distributive competition under redistricting that explains both electoral outcomes and the equilibrium allocation of policy benefits by endogenizing voter pivotality. In a multi-district model with primaries, general elections, and group-targeted transfers, districting shapes political influence through two channels: a selection channel for descriptive representation (who wins office) and a competition channel for substantive representation (who receives policy benefits). District composition alters candidate matchups, shifting voter responsiveness and political leverage, and each channel alone yields distinct predictions about whether packing or cracking voters is optimal. For minority voters, the welfare effects of districting depend on electoral leverage, preferences over descriptive versus partisan representation, primary rules, and competitiveness. The…
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