FL-PBM: Pre-Training Backdoor Mitigation for Federated Learning
Osama Wehbi, Sarhad Arisdakessian, Omar Abdel Wahab, Azzam Mourad, Hadi Otrok, Jamal Bentahar

TL;DR
This paper introduces FL-PBM, a proactive federated learning defense that filters poisoned data before training using PCA, GMM clustering, and trigger disruption, significantly reducing backdoor attack success.
Contribution
The paper presents a novel pre-training backdoor mitigation method for federated learning that effectively detects and sanitizes poisoned data on clients before model training.
Findings
Reduces attack success rates by up to 95% compared to baseline.
Maintains over 90% clean model accuracy in most cases.
Outperforms state-of-the-art defenses in backdoor mitigation.
Abstract
Backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to the integrity and reliability of Artificial Intelligence (AI) models, enabling adversaries to manipulate model behavior by injecting poisoned data with hidden triggers. These attacks can lead to severe consequences, especially in critical applications such as autonomous driving, healthcare, and finance. Detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks is crucial across the lifespan of model's phases, including pre-training, in-training, and post-training. In this paper, we propose Pre-Training Backdoor Mitigation for Federated Learning (FL-PBM), a novel defense mechanism that proactively filters poisoned data on the client side before model training in a federated learning (FL) environment. The approach consists of three stages: (1) inserting a benign trigger into the data to establish a controlled baseline, (2) applying Principal Component…
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