Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning Using PPA and MiniMax Game Theory
Osama Wehbi, Sarhad Arisdakessian, Omar Abdel Wahab, Anderson Avila, Azzam Mourad, Hadi Otrok

TL;DR
This paper introduces FedBBA, a novel federated learning defense combining reputation, incentives, and game theory to significantly reduce backdoor attack success rates while maintaining high accuracy.
Contribution
It proposes FedBBA, integrating reputation systems, incentive mechanisms, and projection pursuit analysis to enhance robustness against backdoor attacks in federated learning.
Findings
FedBBA reduces backdoor attack success rate to 1.1%-11%.
It outperforms state-of-the-art defenses like RDFL and RoPE.
Maintains high normal task accuracy (~95%-98%).
Abstract
Federated Learning (FL) is witnessing wider adoption due to its ability to benefit from large amounts of scattered data while preserving privacy. However, despite its advantages, federated learning suffers from several setbacks that directly impact the accuracy, and the integrity of the global model it produces. One of these setbacks is the presence of malicious clients who actively try to harm the global model by injecting backdoor data into their local models while trying to evade detection. The objective of such clients is to trick the global model into making false predictions during inference, thereby compromising the integrity and trustworthiness of the global model on which honest stakeholders rely. To mitigate such mischievous behavior, we propose FedBBA (Federated Backdoor and Behavior Analysis). The proposed model aims to dampen the effect of such clients on the final…
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