Bribery's Influence on Ranked Aggregation
Pallavi Jain, Anshul Thakur

TL;DR
This paper explores how certain manipulation actions affect the computational complexity of the Kemeny Score problem, showing some can be solved efficiently despite related problems being NP-hard.
Contribution
It demonstrates that specific manipulation actions allow polynomial-time solutions for the Kemeny Score problem, contrasting with their hardness in the context of Kemeny consensus.
Findings
Some manipulation actions enable polynomial-time solutions for Kemeny Score.
Manipulation actions are computationally hard for Kemeny consensus but tractable for Kemeny Score.
The study highlights differences in complexity between related rank aggregation problems.
Abstract
Kemeny Consensus is a well-known rank aggregation method in social choice theory. In this method, given a set of rankings, the goal is to find a ranking that minimizes the total Kendall tau distance to the input rankings. Computing a Kemeny consensus is NP-hard, and even verifying whether a given ranking is a Kemeny consensus is coNP-complete. Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra [IJCAI 2021] established the computational intractability of achieving a desired consensus through manipulative actions. Kemeny Consensus is an optimisation problem related to Kemeny's rule. In this paper, we consider a decision problem related to Kemeny's rule, known as Kemeny Score, in which the goal is to decide whether there exists a ranking whose total Kendall tau distance from the given rankings is at most . Computation of Kemeny score is known to be NP-complete. In this paper, we investigate the…
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