Overcoming the Incentive Collapse Paradox
Qichuan Yin, Ziwei Su, Shuangning Li

TL;DR
This paper introduces a sentinel-auditing payment mechanism and an incentive-aware inference framework to maintain human effort and optimize statistical accuracy under budget constraints in AI-assisted tasks.
Contribution
It proposes a novel incentive-robust payment scheme and an integrated active inference approach that jointly optimize effort enforcement and statistical performance.
Findings
Sentinel-auditing mechanism enforces positive human effort at finite cost.
The framework achieves better cost-error tradeoffs than standard methods.
Experiments validate improved efficiency in budget-constrained settings.
Abstract
AI-assisted task delegation is increasingly common, yet human effort in such systems is costly and typically unobserved. Recent work by Bastani and Cachon (2025); Sambasivan et al. (2021) shows that accuracy-based payment schemes suffer from incentive collapse: as AI accuracy improves, sustaining positive human effort requires unbounded payments. We study this problem in a budget-constrained principal-agent framework with strategic human agents whose output accuracy depends on unobserved effort. We propose a sentinel-auditing payment mechanism that enforces a strictly positive and controllable level of human effort at finite cost, independent of AI accuracy. Building on this incentive-robust foundation, we develop an incentive-aware active statistical inference framework that jointly optimizes (i) the auditing rate and (ii) active sampling and budget allocation across tasks of varying…
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