A note on conditional densities, Bayes' rule, and recent criticisms of Bayesian inference
Alex Yan, Cathal Mills, Augustin Marignier, Younjung Kim, Ben Lambert (University of Oxford)

TL;DR
This paper clarifies the proper use of conditional densities in Bayesian inference, addresses recent criticisms claiming inconsistencies, and demonstrates that these criticisms are based on errors and misunderstandings.
Contribution
It provides an accessible explanation of conditional densities, a rigorous measure-theoretic roadmap, and a critique of recent criticisms of Bayesian inference.
Findings
Conditional densities are well-defined when properly understood.
Recent criticisms contain mathematical errors and deviate from Bayesian principles.
The authors defend the consistency of Bayesian inference against these criticisms.
Abstract
When performing Bayesian inference, we frequently need to work with conditional probability densities. For example, the posterior function is the conditional density of the parameters given the data. Some might worry that conditional densities are ill-defined, considering that for a continuous random variable , the event has probability zero, meaning the formula is inapplicable. In reality, when we work with conditional densities, we never condition directly on the zero-probability event ; rather, we first condition on the random variable , and then we may plug in an observed value . The first purpose of our article is to provide an exposition on conditional densities that elaborates on this point. While we have aimed to make this explanation accessible, we follow it with a roadmap of the measure theory…
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