Experimental School Choice with Parents
Mikhail Freer, Thilo Klein, Josu\'e Ortega

TL;DR
This study experimentally compares three school choice mechanisms with parents as subjects, revealing manipulation behaviors, efficiency-stability tradeoffs, and the impact of cognitive ability on outcomes.
Contribution
First laboratory experiment with parents as decision makers comparing DA, EADA, and RM mechanisms, highlighting manipulation patterns and welfare implications.
Findings
All mechanisms are frequently manipulated.
DA produces stable but inefficient allocations.
RM achieves efficiency at a stability cost.
Abstract
We conduct the first laboratory school choice experiment in which parents-the relevant decision makers in the field-are the experimental subjects. We compare Deferred Acceptance (DA) with two manipulable but potentially more efficient alternatives: Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) and the Rank-Minimizing mechanism (RM). We find that all mechanisms are frequently manipulated, with no significant differences in truth-telling rates. Parents and students manipulate at similar rates, supporting the external validity of student-based experiments, though students make significantly more obvious errors, suggesting parents' deviations are more deliberate. Despite widespread manipulation, the predicted welfare-stability tradeoff largely survives: DA never produces Pareto-efficient allocations yet generates little justified envy; whereas RM delivers substantial efficiency gains at…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSchool Choice and Performance · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Economic Policies and Impacts
