On a stable partnership problem with integer choice functions
Alexander V. Karzanov

TL;DR
This paper generalizes the stable partnership problem to non-bipartite graphs with integer capacities and choice functions, providing a solvability criterion and an algorithm to find stable solutions or certify their non-existence.
Contribution
It introduces a comprehensive framework for the stable partnership problem with integer choice functions, extending previous bipartite results and providing a canonical set of odd cycles when no stable solution exists.
Findings
Provides a solvability criterion for SPPIC
Develops an algorithm to find stable partnerships or certify non-existence
Characterizes the structure of solutions using odd cycles
Abstract
We consider a far generalization of the well-known stable roommates and non-bipartite stable allocation problems. In its setting, one is given a finite non-bipartite graph with nonnegative integer edge capacities , , in which for each vertex (``agent'') , the preferences on the set of its incident edges are given via a choice function acting on the vectors in bounded by the capacities and obeying the standard axioms of substitutability and size monotonicity. We refer to the related stability problem as the stable partnership problem with integer choice functions, or SPPIC for short. Extending well-known results for particular cases, we give a solvability criterion for SPPIC and develop an algorithm of finding a stable solution, called a stable partnership, or establishing that there is none. Moreover, in…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications
