Publicly Understandable Electronic Voting: A Non-Cryptographic, End-to-End Verifiable Scheme

TL;DR

This paper introduces a non-cryptographic, end-to-end verifiable voting scheme that enables voters to independently verify election results using simple arithmetic, enhancing transparency and trust without relying on complex cryptography.

Contribution

It proposes a practical, software-free verification method for elections that combines physical receipts, a public bulletin board, and risk-limiting audits to improve transparency.

Findings

Achieves end-to-end verifiability without cryptography

Allows voters to verify election integrity with basic arithmetic

Ensures systemic integrity through physical evidence and RLAs

Abstract

Modern democracies face an existential crisis of waning public trust in election results. While End-to-End Verifiable (E2E-V) voting systems promise mathematically secure elections, their reliance on complex cryptography creates a ``black box'' that forces blind trust in opaque software or external experts, ultimately failing to build genuine public confidence. To solve this, we introduce the concept of Software-Free Verification (SFV) -- a standard requiring that voters can independently verify election integrity without relying on any software. We propose a practical, non-cryptographic in-booth voting scheme that achieves SFV for national-scale elections. Our approach leverages a public bulletin board of randomized (Pseudonym, Candidate) pairs, where a mechanically generated pseudonym is hidden among real decoy votes on a physical receipt. Our scheme empowers citizens to audit the election using only basic arithmetic via a hierarchical Public Ledger, while anchoring the overall digital tally to physical evidence and Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs) to guarantee systemic integrity. The result is a system that bridges the gap between mathematical security and public transparency, offering a viable blueprint for restoring trust in democratic infrastructure.