The Presupposition Problem in Representation Genesis
Yiling Wu

TL;DR
This paper examines the presupposition problem in understanding how large language models relate to the emergence of representations, highlighting a structural challenge in current philosophical frameworks.
Contribution
It identifies a common presupposition structure in philosophical theories of representation genesis and offers a conceptual diagnosis to address the explanatory deferral.
Findings
Identifies the Representation Presupposition structure in philosophical accounts.
Defines the Representation Regress as a problem in explaining content acquisition.
Provides minimum conditions for theories to avoid the presupposition pattern.
Abstract
Large language models are the first systems to achieve high cognitive performance without clearly undergoing representation genesis: the transition from a non-representing physical system to one whose states guide behavior in a content-sensitive way. Prior cognitive systems had already made this transition before we could examine it, and philosophy of mind treated genesis as a background condition rather than an explanatory target. LLMs provide a case that does not clearly involve this transition, making the genesis question newly urgent: if genesis did not occur, which cognitive capacities are affected, and why? We currently lack the conceptual resources to answer this. The reason, this paper argues, is structural. Major frameworks in philosophy of mind, including the Language of Thought hypothesis, teleosemantics, predictive processing, enactivism, and genetic phenomenology, share a…
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