Agent Control Protocol: Admission Control for Agent Actions
Marcelo Fernandez (TraslaIA)

TL;DR
The paper introduces ACP, a temporal admission control protocol for autonomous agents that enforces behavioral safety through static risk scoring and stateful signals, validated by formal methods and high-performance evaluation.
Contribution
It presents a novel history-aware, deterministic admission control protocol for agents, addressing limitations of stateless engines and identifying vulnerabilities with subsequent improvements.
Findings
ACP limits autonomous actions to 0.4% under workload
Formal verification confirms safety properties with zero violations
High throughput of 1.72 million requests per second achieved
Abstract
Autonomous agents can produce harmful behavioral patterns from individually valid requests -- a threat class per-request policy evaluation cannot address, because stateless engines evaluate each request in isolation. We present ACP, a temporal admission control protocol enforcing behavioral properties over execution traces via static risk scoring combined with stateful signals (anomaly accumulation, cooldown) through a LedgerQuerier abstraction. ACP blocks execution based on deterministic, history-aware risk scoring -- not anomaly detection. Under a 500-request workload where every request is individually valid (RS=35), a stateless engine approves all 500; ACP limits autonomous execution to 2 out of 500 (0.4%), escalating after 3 actions and denying after 11. We identify a state-mixing vulnerability in ACP-RISK-2.0 (cross-context false denials) and introduce ACP-RISK-3.0, scoping…
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