Physics-grounded Mechanism Design for Spectrum Sharing between Passive and Active Users

TL;DR

This paper introduces a physics-based auction mechanism for dynamic spectrum sharing that efficiently allocates spectrum to passive users while incentivizing active users, achieving significant cost reductions and maintaining accuracy.

Contribution

It develops a novel VCG auction framework grounded in radiometric physics for spectrum sharing, with an efficient approximation algorithm for large-scale implementation.

Findings

Reduces spectrum procurement costs by about 60% in case studies.

Avoids high-cost spectrum tiles by aggregating low-cost options.

Ensures efficient and incentive-compatible spectrum allocation.

Abstract

We propose a physics-grounded mechanism design for dynamic spectrum sharing that bridges the gap between radiometric retrieval constraints and economic incentives. We formulate the active and passive users coexistence problem as a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions mechanism, where the radiometer dynamically procures ``quiet'' time-frequency tiles from active users based on the marginal reduction in retrieval error variance. This approach ensures allocative efficiency and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). To overcome the computational intractability of exact VCG on large grids, we derive an approximation algorithm by using the monotone submodularity induced by the radiometer equation. AMSR-2-based simulations show that the approach avoids high-cost tiles by aggregating low-cost spectrum across time and frequency. In an interference-trap case study, the proposed framework reduces procurement costs by about 60% over a fixed-band baseline while satisfying accuracy targets.