Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default

TL;DR

This paper characterizes target rules with a default in public decision-making where agents have single-peaked preferences or complete indifference, using onto-ness and pairwise strategy-proofness.

Contribution

It introduces an augmented single-peaked domain including complete indifference and characterizes target rules with a default through onto-ness and pairwise strategy-proofness.

Findings

Characterization of target rules with a default in augmented domain

Onto-ness and pairwise strategy-proofness are key properties

Applicable to public-good level selection with abstention or none-of-the-above options

Abstract

We study a public decision problem in which a finite society selects a public-good level from a closed interval. Agents either have single-peaked preferences or are completely indifferent over the interval; the latter capture abstention or a "none of the above" stance within the decision process. We study this augmented single-peaked domain. On this domain, we characterize the class of rules called target rules with a default. We show that onto-ness and pairwise strategy-proofness characterize this class of rules.