Voluntary Renewable Programs: Optimal Pricing and Revenue Allocation

TL;DR

This paper presents a multi-period optimization framework for designing voluntary renewable programs, focusing on optimal pricing, revenue allocation, and renewable deployment to maximize renewable energy adoption within a utility's constraints.

Contribution

It introduces an analytical model for optimal VRP pricing and revenue sharing, revealing strategic insights into renewable expansion and the limitations of voluntary programs.

Findings

Optimal pricing depends on grid carbon intensity.

Myopic policy is conditionally optimal for long-term renewable capacity.

Voluntary programs extend renewable penetration but do not achieve net-zero emissions.

Abstract

This paper develops a multi-period optimization framework to design a voluntary renewable program (VRP) for an electric utility company, aiming to maximize total renewable energy deployments. In the business model of VRP, the utility must ensure it generates renewable energy up to the total amount of contract during each market episode (i.e., a year), while all the revenue collected from the VRP must either be used to invest in procuring renewable capacities or to maintain the current renewable fleet and infrastructure. We thus formulate the problem as an optimal pricing problem coupled with revenue allocation and renewable deployment decisions. We model the demand function of voluntary renewable contracts as an exponential decay function based on survey data. We analytically derive the optimal pricing policy of the VRP as a function of the current grid carbon intensity. We prove that a myopic policy is conditionally optimal, which maximizes renewable capacity in each period, attains the long-run optimum due to the utility's revenue-neutral constraint. We show different binding conditions and marginal values of decision variables correspond to different phases of the energy transition, and that the utility should strategically design its revenue-sharing decisions, balancing investments in renewable expansion and subsidizing existing renewable fleets. Finally, we show that voluntary renewable programs can only extend renewable penetration but cannot achieve net-zero emissions or a fully renewable grid. This pricing-allocation-expansion framework highlights both the potential and limitations of voluntary renewable demand, providing analytical insight into optimal policy design and the qualitative shifts occurring during the energy transition process.