Chance-Constrained Correlated Equilibria for Robust Noncooperative Coordination
Jaehan Im, Ufuk Topcu, David Fridovich-Keil

TL;DR
This paper introduces a chance-constrained correlated equilibrium framework that manages uncertainty in agents' costs, balancing robustness and efficiency, and guides information acquisition to improve coordination.
Contribution
It develops a novel chance-constrained formulation for correlated equilibria under uncertainty, with sensitivity analysis and an information-gain metric to enhance robustness.
Findings
CC-CE reduces coordination cost by up to 35% at optimal confidence levels.
Sensitivity analysis links uncertainty reduction to incentive constraint dual sensitivities.
The information-gain metric effectively identifies key uncertainty sources.
Abstract
Correlated equilibria enable a coordinator to influence the self-interested agents by recommending actions that no player has an incentive to deviate from. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism relies on accurate knowledge of the agents' cost structures. When cost parameters are uncertain, the recommended actions may no longer be incentive compatible, allowing agents to benefit from deviating from them. We study a chance-constrained correlated equilibrium problem formulation that accounts for uncertainty in agents' costs and guarantees incentive compatibility with a prescribed confidence level. We derive sensitivity results that quantify how uncertainty in individual incentive constraints affects the expected coordination outcome. In particular, the analysis characterizes the value of information by relating the marginal benefit of reducing uncertainty to the dual sensitivities…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Reinforcement Learning in Robotics · Game Theory and Voting Systems
