On Two-Player Scalar Discrete-Time Linear Quadratic Games

TL;DR

This paper analyzes feedback Nash equilibria in two-player scalar discrete-time linear quadratic games, providing analytical tools, classification methods, and numerical results to understand solution multiplicity and anti-coordination schemes.

Contribution

It offers a detailed analysis of coupled best-response equations, classification of local saddle properties, and explicit conditions for equilibrium existence in scalar LQ games.

Findings

Anti-coordination schemes identified in multiple solution cases

Closed-form expressions for symmetric cases

Numerical validation of theoretical conditions

Abstract

For the characterization of Feedback Nash Equilibria (FNE) in linear quadratic games, this paper provides a detailed analysis of the discrete-time discounted coupled best-response equations for the scalar two-player setting, together with a set of analytical tools for the classification of local saddle property for the iterative best-response method. Through analytical and numerical results we show the importance of classification, revealing an anti-coordination scheme in the case of multiple solutions. Particular attention is given to the symmetric case, where identical cost function parameters allow closed-form expressions and explicit necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and multiplicity of FNE. We also present numerical results that illustrate the theoretical findings and offer foundational insights for the design and validation of iterative NE-seeking methods.