Electoral Systems Simulator: An Open Framework for Comparing Electoral Mechanisms Across Voter Distribution Scenarios
Sumit Mukherjee

TL;DR
This paper introduces an open-source Python framework for simulating and comparing various electoral systems across different voter preference scenarios, using a geometric median-based metric to evaluate their performance.
Contribution
It provides a flexible, extensible simulation platform that evaluates multiple electoral mechanisms against a common metric across diverse voter distributions.
Findings
Plurality and ranked-choice systems perform variably across scenarios.
Proportional systems tend to better approximate the geometric median.
A novel Boltzmann softmax influence mechanism serves as a theoretical benchmark.
Abstract
Here we present \texttt{electoral\_sim}, an open-source Python framework for simulating and comparing electoral systems across diverse voter preference distributions. The framework represents voters and candidates as points in a two-dimensional ideological space, derives sincere ballot profiles from Euclidean preference distances, and evaluates several standard electoral mechanisms -- including plurality, ranked-choice, approval, score, Condorcet, and two proportional representation systems -- against a common primary metric: the Euclidean distance between the electoral outcome and the geometric median of the voter distribution. We evaluate these systems across many empirically-grounded scenarios ranging from unimodal consensus electorates to sharply polarised bimodal configurations, reporting both single-run and Monte Carlo stability results across 200 trials per scenario. As a case…
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Taxonomy
TopicsElectoral Systems and Political Participation · Benford’s Law and Fraud Detection · Game Theory and Voting Systems
