Temporal Network Creation Games: The Impact of Flexible Labels

TL;DR

This paper extends temporal network creation models by allowing agents to purchase edges and choose their appearance times, analyzing equilibrium existence and efficiency bounds in various reachability and cost settings.

Contribution

It introduces a flexible temporal network creation game model where agents control edge timing, providing new theoretical results on equilibria and efficiency bounds.

Findings

Existence of Nash equilibria in the extended model

Bounds on Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability

Analysis across multiple reachability and cost function settings

Abstract

A crucial aspect of research is understanding how real-world networks, such as transportation and information networks, are formed. A prominent model for such networks was introduced by \cite{fabrikant_network_2003} and extended by \cite{bilo_temporal_2023}, incorporating temporal graphs to better represent real-world networks. In this model, there is a given host graph with $n$ agents (represented by nodes) and time labels on the edges. Each agent can establish connections by purchasing edges. This makes the edges present at the time steps given by the time labels of the host graph. The goal of each agent is to reach as many other agents as possible while minimizing the number of edges bought. However, this model makes the simplifying assumption that each edge comes with predetermined time steps. We address this deficiency by extending the model of Bilo et al. \cite{bilo_temporal_2023} to allow agents to purchase edges and to decide when they appear. To capture a variety of real-world applications, we study two reachability models and several cost functions based on the label an agent assigns to an edge. For these settings, we provide proofs of existence of Nash equilibria, as well as lower and upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability.