Alkaid: Resilience to Edit Errors in Provably Secure Steganography via Distance-Constrained Encoding
Zhihan Cao, Gaolei Li, Jun Wu, Jianhua Li, Hang Zhang, Mingzhe Chen

TL;DR
Alkaid introduces a provably secure steganographic scheme that is robust against edit errors by integrating distance-constrained encoding, achieving high decoding success, capacity, and efficiency.
Contribution
It presents the first provably secure steganography method resilient to edit errors through distance-constrained encoding with theoretical guarantees.
Findings
Achieves 99-100% decoding success rate under various error channels.
Provides a payload of 0.2 bits per token with high embedding capacity.
Maintains an encoding speed of 6.72 bits per second, outperforming SOTA methods.
Abstract
While provably secure steganography provides strong concealment by ensuring stego carriers are indistinguishable from natural samples, such systems remain vulnerable to real-world edit errors (e.g., insertions, deletions, substitutions) because their decoding depends on perfect synchronization and lacks error-correcting capability. To bridge this gap, we propose Alkaid, a provably secure steganographic scheme resilient to edit errors via distance-constrained encoding. The key innovation integrates the minimum distance decoding principle directly into the encoding process by enforcing a strict lower bound on the edit distance between codewords of different messages. Specifically, if two candidate codewords violate this bound, they are merged to represent the same message, thereby guaranteeing reliable recovery. While maintaining provable security, we theoretically prove that Alkaid…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques · DNA and Biological Computing · Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
