Incentive Aware AI Regulations: A Credal Characterisation
Anurag Singh, Julian Rodemann, Rajeev Verma, Siu Lun Chau, Krikamol Muandet

TL;DR
This paper models AI regulation as a mechanism design problem under uncertainty, proposing a framework that incentivizes compliance and excludes non-compliant providers through credal sets, with practical experiments on fairness and spurious features.
Contribution
It introduces a novel regulation mechanism framework based on credal sets, linking mechanism design with imprecise probability for enforceable AI regulations.
Findings
Mechanisms achieve perfect market outcomes when non-compliant distributions form a credal set.
The framework connects regulation design with imprecise probability theory.
Experimental results demonstrate regulation of spurious features and fairness in predictions.
Abstract
While high-stakes ML applications demand strict regulations, strategic ML providers often evade them to lower development costs. To address this challenge, we cast AI regulation as a mechanism design problem under uncertainty and introduce regulation mechanisms: a framework that maps empirical evidence from models to a license for some market share. The providers can select from a set of licenses, effectively forcing them to bet on their model's ability to fulfil regulation. We aim at regulation mechanisms that achieve perfect market outcome, i.e. (a) drive non-compliant providers to self-exclude, and (b) ensure participation from compliant providers. We prove that a mechanism has perfect market outcome if and only if the set of non-compliant distributions forms a credal set, i.e., a closed, convex set of probability measures. This result connects mechanism design and imprecise…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEthics and Social Impacts of AI · Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) · Auction Theory and Applications
