Leveraging Structural Knowledge for Solving Election in Anonymous Networks with Shared Randomness
J\'er\'emie Chalopin, Emmanuel Godard

TL;DR
This paper characterizes when randomized algorithms can solve the Election problem in anonymous networks with shared or unshared randomness, based on the amount of structural knowledge available to nodes.
Contribution
It provides a complete characterization of the conditions for randomized Election algorithms to exist under various structural knowledge assumptions in anonymous networks.
Findings
Complete characterization of Election solvability with shared and unshared randomness.
Extension of deterministic impossibility proofs to randomized algorithms.
Application of the framework to various knowledge scenarios and existing algorithms.
Abstract
We study the classical Election problem in anonymous net- works, where solutions can rely on the use of random bits, which may be either shared or unshared among nodes. We provide a complete char- acterization of the conditions under which a randomized Election algo- rithm exists, for arbitrary structural knowledge. Our analysis considers both Las Vegas and Monte Carlo randomized algorithms, under the as- sumptions of shared and unshared randomness. In our setting, random sources are considered shared if the output bits are identical across spe- cific subsets of nodes. The algorithms and impossibility proofs are extensions of those of [5] for the deterministic setting. Our results are a complete generalization of those from [8]. Moreover, as applications, we consider many specific knowledge: no knowledge, a bound on the size, a bound on the number of nodes sharing a source, the size, or…
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Taxonomy
TopicsDistributed systems and fault tolerance · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Game Theory and Voting Systems
