Unix Tools and the FITO Category Mistake: Crash Consistency and the Protocol Nature of Persistence
Paul Borrill

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that the common assumption of atomic state transitions in Unix filesystem operations is fundamentally flawed, leading to widespread system failures and data corruption due to the impossibility of true atomic persistence.
Contribution
It introduces a formal analysis proving the impossibility of atomic persistence primitives under failure, revealing a fundamental category mistake in current filesystem abstractions.
Findings
Filesystem abstractions are false and misleading.
No syscall-based primitive can guarantee atomic persistence under failure.
Real-world failures include cloud outages, data corruption, and AI training waste.
Abstract
Unix tools such as ls, cp, mv, and rename expose a filesystem abstraction that appears to present a single, authoritative state evolving through atomic transitions. This abstraction is false. We present a systematic Forward-In-Time-Only (FITO) analysis demonstrating that the assumption of instantaneous atomic state transitions constitutes a category mistake at every layer of the computing stack -- from ext4 journaling and delayed allocation, through fsync failure semantics, NVMe Flush/FUA device behavior, and Linux restartable sequences, down to the x86-64 CPU's own inability to guarantee atomic supervisor entry under Non-Maskable Interrupts. We prove a formal impossibility result: no syscall-based persistence primitive can define a commit boundary under failure, because the syscall return value is consistent with multiple materially different persistence states across Linux…
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Taxonomy
TopicsDistributed systems and fault tolerance · Advanced Data Storage Technologies · Security and Verification in Computing
