Fair Division Under Inaccurate Preferences
Trung Dang, Daniel Halpern, Anuran Makur, Alexandros Psomas, Japneet Singh, and Paritosh Verma

TL;DR
This paper investigates fair division of indivisible items under inaccurate preferences, proposing algorithms that achieve envy minimization in stochastic and worst-case noise settings, with theoretical guarantees.
Contribution
It introduces new algorithms and bounds for fair division with noisy preferences, extending stochastic and worst-case models to handle inaccuracy in preferences.
Findings
High-probability envy-free allocations under stochastic preferences.
Tight bounds for envy achieved by Round-Robin with bounded noise.
Efficient online algorithm with logarithmic envy in worst-case noisy preferences.
Abstract
The fair allocation of scarce resources is a central problem in mathematics, computer science, operations research, and economics. While much of the fair-division literature assumes that individuals have underlying cardinal preferences, eliciting exact numerical values is often cognitively burdensome and prone to inaccuracies. A growing body of work in fair division addresses this challenge by assuming access only to ordinal preferences. However, the restricted expressiveness of ordinal preferences makes it challenging to quantify and optimize cardinal fairness objectives such as envy. In this paper, we explore the broad landscape of fair division of indivisible items given inaccurate cardinal preferences, with a focus on minimizing envy. We consider various settings based on whether the true preferences of the agents are stochastic or worst-case, and whether the inaccuracies, modeled…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
