Endogenous Poverty Traps in Continuous Time: A Signaling Approach
Massimo Giannini

TL;DR
This paper models endogenous poverty traps in continuous time using a signaling framework, showing how signaling costs and regime-specific productivity lead to stable wealth distributions and polarization among agents.
Contribution
It introduces a signaling friction into a continuous-time heterogeneous agent model, revealing endogenous poverty traps and polarization dynamics with observable consumption patterns.
Findings
Existence of an endogenous Skiba threshold for upgrading productivity.
Stable interior attractors in each regime due to diminishing returns.
Distinct agent states coexist at the same wealth levels, affecting mobility and consumption.
Abstract
This paper embeds a signaling friction into the continuous-time heterogeneous agent framework. A continuum of producers operate Cobb-Douglas technologies with regime-specific productivity . Stochastic arrival of signaling opportunities and skill obsolescence risk generate an optimal stopping problem -- when to pay a lump-sum cost to upgrade productivity -- whose solution yields an endogenous Skiba threshold . Diminishing returns create a stable interior attractor in each regime; the signaling cost separates the two basins, producing a poverty trap that is an interior optimum rather than a corner solution. The stationary distribution exhibits Twin Peaks, but its decomposition by regime reveals that agents in three distinct states -- structurally trapped, waiting to signal, and successfully upgraded -- coexist at the same wealth levels with different…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis · Game Theory and Applications
