De-Idealizing De-Idealization: Beyond Full Reversal

TL;DR

This paper challenges traditional views on de-idealization in scientific models, proposing a broader, practice-based approach that includes intra-model, inter-model, and measurement de-idealizations, supported by physics examples.

Contribution

It introduces a more realistic, practice-driven account of de-idealization, expanding beyond the standard philosophical notion to include various procedures used in physics.

Findings

Physics examples demonstrate multiple de-idealization procedures.

Idealizations can be scrutinized without strict adherence to philosophical standards.

The approach broadens understanding of model justification in scientific practice.

Abstract

There is a question of whether de-idealization is needed for justified use of -- for 'checking' -- idealizations. We argue that the standard philosophical account of de-idealization has become too idealized, but that this does not preclude the possibility of justificatory practices which show how models can be used to make inferences about the world. In turn, motivated by examples in physics, we provide a more expansive and practice-driven account of de-idealization by relaxing the standards for closeness to more realistic theoretical items, identifying at least three kinds of procedures for de-idealization: intra-model, inter-model, and measurement de-idealizations. These examples highlight how idealizations can be -- and indeed have been -- scrutinized within physics without appealing to the philosopher's idealized notion of de-idealization.