Market Inefficiency in Cryptoasset Markets
Joel Hasbrouck, Julian Ma, Fahad Saleh, Caspar Schwarz-Schilling

TL;DR
This paper provides evidence of market inefficiency in cryptoasset markets by showing that equilibrium restrictions are violated, indicating the presence of frictions that hinder proper capital reallocation beyond mispricing.
Contribution
It introduces a novel approach to test market efficiency by analyzing investments with shared dominant risks but differing secondary risks, deriving equilibrium restrictions for validation.
Findings
Empirical rejection of equilibrium restrictions in crypto markets
Evidence of market frictions impeding capital reallocation
Market inefficiency not explained by risk mispricing
Abstract
We demonstrate market inefficiency in cryptoasset markets. Our approach examines investments that share a dominant risk factor but differ in their exposure to a secondary risk. We derive equilibrium restrictions that must hold regardless of how investors price either risk. Our empirical results strongly reject these necessary equilibrium restrictions. The rejection implies market inefficiency that cannot be attributed to mispriced risk, suggesting the presence of frictions that impede capital reallocation.
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Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Financial Markets and Investment Strategies · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
