Post-Quantum Sanitizable Signatures from McEliece-Based Chameleon Hashing
Shahzad Ahmad, Stefan Rass, Zahra Seyedi

TL;DR
This paper presents the first transparent, code-based post-quantum sanitizable signature scheme that allows controlled message modification while maintaining security, based on McEliece cryptosystem and chameleon hashing.
Contribution
It introduces a novel post-quantum sanitizable signature scheme using McEliece-based chameleon hashing with formal security proofs and a new transparency property.
Findings
Scheme is existentially unforgeable under syndrome decoding hardness
Achieves perfect transparency with specific weight constraints
Provides formal security proofs in the random-oracle model
Abstract
We introduce a novel post-quantum sanitizable signature scheme constructed upon a chameleon hash function derived from the McEliece cryptosystem. In this design, the designated sanitizer possesses the inherent trapdoor of a Goppa code, which facilitates controlled collision-finding via Patterson decoding. This mechanism enables authorized modification of specific message blocks while ensuring all other content remains immutably bound. We provide formal security definitions and rigorous proofs of existential unforgeability and immutability, grounded in the hardness of syndrome decoding in the random-oracle model, where a robust random oracle thwarts trivial linear hash collisions. A key innovation lies in our precise characterization of the transparency property: by imposing a specific weight constraint on the randomizers generated by the signer, we achieve perfect transparency,…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsCryptography and Data Security · Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption · Cryptographic Implementations and Security
