Competition Versus Complexity in Multiple-Selection Prophet Inequalities
Eugenio Cruz-Ossa, Sebastian Perez-Salazar, Victor Verdugo

TL;DR
This paper investigates how increased competition allows simple online algorithms to approximate the optimal prophet benchmark in multi-unit welfare maximization, revealing a phase transition and exact competition complexity for the single-unit case.
Contribution
It characterizes the competition complexity for single-threshold algorithms in multi-unit prophet inequalities, revealing a phase transition and resolving an open question for the case k=1.
Findings
Single-threshold algorithms are limited to a 1-1/√(2kπ) fraction of the prophet value without competition.
Slight increases in the number of observations dramatically improve the approximation ratio.
Exact competition complexity for k=1 is ln(1/ε), resolving prior open questions.
Abstract
Competition complexity formalizes a compelling intuition: rather than refining the mechanism, how much additional competition is sufficient for a simple mechanism to compete with an optimal one? We begin the study of this question in multi-unit pricing for welfare maximization using prophet inequalities. An online decision-maker observes nonnegative values drawn independently from a known distribution, may select up to of them, and aims to maximize the expected sum of selected values. The benchmark is a prophet who observes a sequence of length and selects the largest values. We focus on the widely adopted class of single-threshold algorithms and fully characterize their -competition complexity. Notably, our results reveal a sharp competition-induced phase transition: in the absence of competition, single-threshold algorithms are…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
