Political influence and corporate profits: a study of Hungarian firms
Zoltan Bartha

TL;DR
This study examines how political influence in Hungary during the 2010s increased corporate rents in specific sectors, using profit share analysis of major firms to quantify the extent of political rent seeking.
Contribution
It introduces a theoretical model of political rent seeking and empirically quantifies its impact on Hungarian firms' profits across sectors over time.
Findings
Significant increase in agricultural sector profit share (320%)
Over fivefold rise in construction sector profit share
More than 6.5 times increase in financial sector profit share
Abstract
This paper investigates the extent of political rent seeking in Hungary in the 2010s. Political capitalism--where powerful private interests influence public policy for private gain--creates opportunities for rent seeking that vary across sectors. The analysis is based on a theoretical model assuming rent seeking occurs in a three-stage process: changes in economic institutions granting regulatory privileges, which are enhanced by political-business networks; this leads to scarcities, and increased market power in certain markets; which then generates rents. To quantify this, the study evaluates Hungarian political capitalism by examining the impact of political decisions on firms' rents, analysing the profit trends of the 1,000 largest Hungarian firms (selected annually by net sales) and comparing their mean profit share (earnings before tax) across two periods: 2008-2012 and…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCooperative Studies and Economics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Hungarian Social, Economic and Educational Studies
