Orbital Escalation: Modeling Satellite Ransomware Attacks Using Game Theory

TL;DR

This paper introduces the first game-theoretic model for satellite ransomware attacks, providing a formal framework to analyze attacker and defender strategies under orbital constraints, demonstrated through a GPS III satellite case study.

Contribution

It presents a novel orbital escalation game model for ransomware on satellites, incorporating dynamic programming and orbital constraints, which is a new approach in satellite cybersecurity.

Findings

Optimal defender strategies can be derived using dynamic programming.

The model helps identify the best response strategies at each orbital pass.

Application to GPS III demonstrates practical utility of the framework.

Abstract

Ransomware has yet to reach orbit, but the conditions for such an attack already exist. This paper presents the first game-theoretic framework for modeling ransomware against satellites: the orbital escalation game. In this model, the attacker escalates ransom demands across orbital passes, while the defender chooses their best strategy, e.g., attempt a restore procedure. Using dynamic programming, we solve the defender's optimal strategy and the attacker's expected payoff under real orbital constraints. Additionally, we provide a GPS III satellite case study that demonstrates how our orbital escalation game can be applied in the context of a fictional but feasible ransomware attack to derive the best strategies at every step. In conclusion, this foundational model offers satellite owners, policy makers and researchers, a formal framework to better prepare their responses when a spacecraft is held for ransom.