Condorcet Dimension and Pareto Optimality for Matchings and Beyond
Telikepalli Kavitha, Jannik Matuschke, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin

TL;DR
This paper explores the concept of Condorcet-winning sets in matching problems, revealing their connection to Pareto optimality, and investigates their existence, size, and computational complexity under various preference structures.
Contribution
It establishes a link between Condorcet-winning sets and Pareto optimality, and analyzes their properties and computational complexity under different preference orderings and constraints.
Findings
Any Pareto-optimal set of two matchings is a Condorcet-winning set.
Existence of small Condorcet-winning sets varies with preference structures.
Deciding the existence of a Condorcet-winning set of fixed size is NP-hard.
Abstract
We study matching problems in which agents form one side of a bipartite graph and have preferences over objects on the other side. A central solution concept in this setting is popularity: a matching is popular if it is a (weak) Condorcet winner, meaning that no other matching is preferred by a strict majority of agents. It is well known, however, that Condorcet winners need not exist. We therefore turn to a natural and prominent relaxation. A set of matchings is a Condorcet-winning set if, for every competing matching, a majority of agents prefers their favorite matching in the set over the competitor. The Condorcet dimension is the smallest cardinality of a Condorcet-winning set. Our main results reveal a connection between Condorcet-winning sets and Pareto optimality. We show that any Pareto-optimal set of two matchings is, in particular, a Condorcet-winning set. This implication…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Auction Theory and Applications
