How to Disclose? Strategic AI Disclosure in Crowdfunding
Ning Wang, Chen Liang

TL;DR
This study investigates how mandatory AI disclosure in crowdfunding impacts project success, revealing that disclosure often reduces funding but can be mitigated by strategic signaling and authenticity cues.
Contribution
It provides empirical evidence on the effects of AI disclosure strategies in crowdfunding, combining natural experiments and online experiments to identify moderating signals.
Findings
Mandatory AI disclosure decreases funds raised by 39.8% and backers by 23.9%.
High authenticity and explicitness in disclosure mitigate negative effects.
Excessive emotional positivity can worsen crowdfunding outcomes.
Abstract
As artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly integrates into crowdfunding practices, strategic disclosure of AI involvement has become critical. Yet, empirical insights into how different disclosure strategies influence investor decisions remain limited. Drawing on signaling theory and Aristotle's rhetorical framework, we examine how mandatory AI disclosure affects crowdfunding performance and how substantive signals (degree of AI involvement) and rhetorical signals (logos/explicitness, ethos/authenticity, pathos/emotional tone) moderate these effects. Leveraging Kickstarter's mandatory AI disclosure policy as a natural experiment and four supplementary online experiments, we find that mandatory AI disclosure significantly reduces crowdfunding performance: funds raised decline by 39.8% and backer counts by 23.9% for AI-involved projects. However, this adverse effect is systematically…
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Taxonomy
TopicsFinTech, Crowdfunding, Digital Finance · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Digital Marketing and Social Media
