Simpler Than You Think: The Practical Dynamics of Ranked Choice Voting
Sanyukta Deshpande, Nikhil Garg, Sheldon H. Jacobson

TL;DR
This study empirically demonstrates that Ranked Choice Voting (RCV), despite theoretical criticisms, is practically simple, transparent, and enhances electoral competitiveness, with minimal manipulation and ballot exhaustion effects across diverse U.S. elections.
Contribution
The paper provides the first large-scale empirical analysis showing RCV's practical simplicity, robustness, and democratic benefits, supported by a novel computational approach for election analysis.
Findings
RCV closely mirrors plurality election transparency in practice.
Post-adoption, competitiveness increased with smaller margins of victory.
Ballot exhaustion minimally impacts election outcomes.
Abstract
Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) adoption is expanding across U.S. elections, but faces persistent criticism for complexity, strategic manipulation, and ballot exhaustion. We empirically test these concerns on real election data, across three diverse contexts: New York City's 2021 Democratic primaries (54 races), Alaska's 2024 primary-infused statewide elections (52 races), and Portland's 2024 multi-winner City Council elections (4 races). Our algorithmic approach circumvents computational complexity barriers by reducing election instance sizes (via candidate elimination). Our findings reveal that despite its intricate multi-round process and theoretical vulnerabilities, RCV consistently exhibits simple and transparent dynamics in practice, closely mirroring the interpretability of plurality elections. Following RCV adoption, competitiveness increased substantially compared to prior…
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Taxonomy
TopicsElectoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
