Offline Learning of Nash Stable Coalition Structures with Possibly Overlapping Coalitions
Saar Cohen

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new model for coalition formation with overlapping coalitions under partial information, proposing algorithms to efficiently learn preferences from offline data and achieve approximate Nash stability.
Contribution
It develops the first algorithms for offline learning of overlapping coalition preferences with partial data, providing sample complexity bounds and stability guarantees.
Findings
Algorithms achieve near-optimal sample complexity.
Effective preference inference from limited dataset.
Converges to stable coalition structures in experiments.
Abstract
Coalition formation concerns strategic collaborations of selfish agents that form coalitions based on their preferences. It is often assumed that coalitions are disjoint and preferences are fully known, which may not hold in practice. In this paper, we thus present a new model of coalition formation with possibly overlapping coalitions under partial information, where selfish agents may be part of multiple coalitions simultaneously and their full preferences are initially unknown. Instead, information about past interactions and associated utility feedback is stored in a fixed offline dataset, and we aim to efficiently infer the agents' preferences from this dataset. We analyze the impact of diverse dataset information constraints by studying two types of utility feedback that can be stored in the dataset: agent- and coalition-level utility feedback. For both feedback models, we…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications
