MarcoPolo: A Zero-Permission Attack for Location Type Inference from the Magnetic Field using Mobile Devices
Beatrice Perez, Abhinav Mehrotra, Mirco Musolesi

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates a zero-permission attack that infers location types using magnetic field data from mobile device magnetometers, achieving around 40% accuracy without needing user permissions.
Contribution
It introduces a novel method for location-type inference exploiting magnetometer data, bypassing permission restrictions and using multiple classification techniques evaluated in real-world settings.
Findings
Achieved approximately 40% accuracy in location-type classification.
Demonstrated effectiveness across different devices and locations.
Validated the attack's feasibility in real-world scenarios.
Abstract
Location information extracted from mobile devices has been largely exploited to reveal our routines, significant places, and interests just to name a few. Given the sensitivity of the information it reveals, location access is protected by mobile operating systems and users have control over which applications can access it. We argue that applications can still infer the coarse-grain location information by using alternative sensors that are available in off-the-shelf mobile devices that do not require any permissions from the users. In this paper we present a zero-permission attack based on the use of the in-built magnetometer, considering a variety of methods for identifying location-types from their magnetic signature. We implement the proposed approach by using four different techniques for time-series classification. In order to evaluate the approach, we conduct an in-the-wild…
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