Puppets or partners? Governing cyborg propaganda in the digital public square

TL;DR

This paper introduces 'cyborg propaganda,' a hybrid influence strategy combining verified human accounts with automation, posing new challenges to democratic discourse and existing regulations.

Contribution

It develops the concept of cyborg propaganda as an underexplored threat, analyzing its architecture, implications, and proposing regulatory responses.

Findings

Cyborg propaganda exploits regulatory gray zones.

Democratic states are both capable of regulation and constrained by rule of law.

Non-democratic actors face fewer accountability mechanisms.

Abstract

The distinction between genuine grassroots activism and automated influence operations is collapsing. While contemporary policy debates prioritize fully autonomous generative agents and synthetic content, this paper offers a conceptual contribution: we develop 'cyborg propaganda,' a closed-loop architecture combining verified human accounts with algorithmic automation to generate personalized content at scale, as a distinct and undertheorized threat to democratic discourse. By relying on verified citizens to ratify AI-generated messages, these campaigns exploit a regulatory gray zone that frameworks built on the human/bot binary (including the EU AI Act and Section 230) are structurally unable to address. Drawing on a conceptual analysis of coordination platforms and comparative examination of governance frameworks across democratic and non-democratic contexts, we analyze this paradox across micro, meso, and macro levels. We examine whether cyborg propaganda democratizes political power by unionizing influence or reduces citizens to cognitive proxies of a hidden directive, arguing that it shifts political discourse from a contest of ideas to a battle of algorithmic campaigns. We propose three regulatory responses: classifying coordination hubs as political action committees to enforce supply-chain transparency; mandating researcher access to platform data through DSA-style mechanisms; and establishing risk standards penalizing amplification of synthetically coordinated content. Comparative analysis reveals that viability varies structurally. Democratic states are simultaneously the most capable of regulation and the most rule-of-law constrained. By contrast, non-democratic actors face no comparable accountability, making international risk standards the primary cross-border enforcement mechanism.