Scale-Invariant Fast Convergence in Games
Taira Tsuchiya, Haipeng Luo, Shinji Ito

TL;DR
This paper introduces scale-invariant learning dynamics that guarantee fast convergence to equilibrium in games without prior knowledge of utility scales, applicable to both two-player zero-sum and multiplayer general-sum games.
Contribution
It develops scale-free, scale-invariant algorithms with provable convergence rates for various game types, eliminating the need for utility scale prior knowledge.
Findings
Bounded external regret by ten A_{ ext{diff}}
Achieved ten A_{ ext{diff}} / T convergence rate in zero-sum games
Bounded swap regret by O(U_{ ext{max}} \u2217 \u007elog T) in general-sum games
Abstract
Scale-invariance in games has recently emerged as a widely valued desirable property. Yet, almost all fast convergence guarantees in learning in games require prior knowledge of the utility scale. To address this, we develop learning dynamics that achieve fast convergence while being both scale-free, requiring no prior information about utilities, and scale-invariant, remaining unchanged under positive rescaling of utilities. For two-player zero-sum games, we obtain scale-free and scale-invariant dynamics with external regret bounded by , where is the payoff range, which implies an convergence rate to Nash equilibrium after rounds. For multiplayer general-sum games with players and actions, we obtain scale-free and scale-invariant dynamics with swap regret bounded by $O(U_{\mathrm{max}} \log…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Game Theory and Applications · Stochastic Gradient Optimization Techniques
