Trading in CEXs and DEXs with Priority Fees and Stochastic Delays
Philippe Bergault, Yadh Hafsi, Leandro S\'anchez-Betancourt

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel stochastic impulse control framework for optimal trading across centralized and decentralized exchanges, accounting for delays, costs, and priority fees, with implications for latency risk management.
Contribution
It extends impulse control models by incorporating stochastic delay choices and multiple pending orders, applied to optimal trading between CEXs and DEXs.
Findings
Optimal priority fee significantly improves trading performance.
Model provides insights into latency risk management strategies.
Mathematically derives dynamic programming principles for complex impulse controls.
Abstract
We develop a mixed control framework that combines absolutely continuous controls with impulse interventions subject to stochastic execution delays. The model extends current impulse control formulations by allowing (i) the controller to choose the mean of the stochastic delay of their impulses, and allowing (ii) for multiple pending orders, so that several impulses can be submitted and executed asynchronously at random times. The framework is motivated by an optimal trading problem between centralized (CEX) and decentralized (DEX) exchanges. In DEXs, traders control the distribution of the execution delay through the priority fee paid, introducing a fundamental trade-off between delays, uncertainty, and costs. We study the optimal trading problem of an agent exploiting trading signals in CEXs and DEXs. From a mathematical perspective, we derive the associated dynamic programming…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsStochastic processes and financial applications · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications
