How to Ask for Belief Statistics without Distortion?
Yi-Chun Chen, Ruoyu Wang, Xinhan Zhang

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel mechanism for eliciting belief statistics in experiments without distorting participants' actions, ensuring truthful reporting through a decomposition approach and a joint alignment condition.
Contribution
It proposes the Counterfactual Scoring Rule (CSR) for nondistortionary belief elicitation and characterizes when fixed belief questions can be elicited truthfully without affecting actions.
Findings
CSR achieves nondistortionary belief elicitation for single statistics.
Joint alignment condition is necessary and sufficient for fixed belief questions.
The approach applies to general task-payoff structures.
Abstract
Belief elicitation is ubiquitous in experiments but can distort behavior in the main tasks. We study when, and how, an experimenter can ask for a series of action-dependent belief statistics after a subject chooses an action, while incentivize truthful reports without distorting the subject's optimal action in the main experimental tasks. We first propose a novel mechanism called the Counterfactual Scoring Rule (CSR), which achieves such nondistortionary elicitation of any single belief statistic by decomposing it into supplemental action-independent statistics. In contrast, when eliciting a fixed set of belief statistics without such decomposition, we show that robust nondistortionary elicitation is achievable if and only if the questions satisfy a joint alignment condition with the task payoff. The necessity of joint alignment is established through a graph theoretical approach, while…
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Taxonomy
TopicsMobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
