Administrative Law's Fourth Settlement: AI and the Capability-Accountability Trap
Nicholas Caputo

TL;DR
This paper proposes a new administrative law framework leveraging AI to enhance transparency and oversight, addressing the capability-accountability trap that has historically hindered democratic control over complex agencies.
Contribution
It introduces three doctrinal innovations—Model and System Dossier, material-model-change trigger, and deference to audit—to enable AI-assisted transparent oversight in administrative law.
Findings
AI can translate technical complexity into accessible oversight information.
The proposed framework aims to balance agency capability with democratic accountability.
These innovations facilitate auditable and comprehensible AI decision-making in government.
Abstract
Since 1887, administrative law has navigated a "capability-accountability trap": technological change forces government to become more sophisticated, but sophistication renders agencies opaque to generalist overseers like the courts and Congress. The law's response--substituting procedural review for substantive oversight--has produced a sedimentary accretion of requirements that ossify capacity without ensuring democratic control. This Article argues that the Supreme Court's post-Loper Bright retrenchment is best understood as an effort to shrink administration back to comprehensible size in response to this complexification. But reducing complexity in this way sacrifices capability precisely when climate change, pandemics, and AI risks demand more sophisticated governance. AI offers a different path. Unlike many prior administrative technologies that increased opacity alongside…
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